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ABSTRACT

This thesis exam ines the ethical and historical foundations for a Fully
Informed Jury Amendment, legislation that recognizes the "nullification" pow er of
the jury. The ethical discussion focu ses on the dual role of the jury deliberation
p ro cess paralleling the distinction betw een natural law and legalism. H obbesian
equity is contrasted with Aristotelian equity to further discussion of the ethical
rationale for acknow ledging a juror's duty to act according to his conscience for
the sak e of justice. T he historical tradition of "trial by jury" a s a political p ro cess
is traced from its inception by Henry II through the p resen t with em phasis on the
jury's function a s a moral check on government. It is advocated that legal
protection be extended to the right of citizens to exercise th e "nullification" power
in order to maintain a highly regarded system of law b a se d on equity and
founded on the moral integrity of its citizens.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose cf this th esis is to determ ine if a Fully Informed Jury
A m endm ent would help individual citizens regain their position a s a check on the
moral authority of government.
A Fully Informed Jury Am endm ent would require ju d g es to inform juries of
their right to determ ine the law a s well a s the facts. Legal recognition of this
inherent right of jurors will em pow er the jury to once again b e th e final authority
in determ ining which governm ent activities are within the law.
In order to m ake this determ ination I will: (1) establish that the trial by jury
p ro cess is an integral part of our political heritage (C hapter 2); (2) prove that it is
an unethical practice for the courts to disallow jurors know ledge of their power to
act in acco rd an ce with their conscien ce and b est s e n s e of justice ("nullification")
(C hapter 3); (3) exam ine argum ents for and against allowing the nullification
instruction and the political significance of each (C hapter 4); (4) determ ine if a
Fully Informed Jury A m endm ent could restore the role of th e individual citizen a s
a moral check on governm ent activity (also C hapter 4); and (5) identify the
educational stan c e that hinders the developm ent of citizenship and the
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acquisition of the historical foundation of the Fully Informed Jury tradition
n e c e ssa ry for citizens to maintain the political order in a free society (C hapter 5).
As for policy recom m endations, the results of this investigation will
provide me with the research n e c e ssa ry to develop an educational unit on the
trial by jury p ro cess and the im portance of the individual in this p ro cess of
maintaining a free society. This draft unit can then be recom m ended to the
Clark County School District. On a personal level, this research will provide the
proper perspective of my role a s a juror the next time I am called to serve.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORY OF THE INHERENT
POW ER OF A TRIAL
BY JURY

The purpose of this chapter is to m ake clear to the re a d er that the history
of the p ro c e ss of trial by jury indicates that an inherent pow er exists within the
individual jurors to act a s a check on th e moral authority of the state when it
m oves to exert the force of law against any individual. In 1852 Lysander
S pooner so aptly stated in An E ssay On The Trial By Jury:
It is also their [the juror's] right, and their primary and param ount duty, to
judge of the justice of th e law, and to hold all laws invalid, that are, in their
opinion, unjust or oppressive, and all p erso n s guiltless in violating, or
resisting the execution of, such la w s1
This indirectly incorporates the p ro cess of trial by jury into the political process.
T he first section of this chap ter will trace the developm ent of th e jury
pro cess from its English inception into th e political p ro cess by Henry II through
the American Revolution. It w as during this time period that the ethical
foundations b a se d on custom and tradition w ere laid for a jury p ro cess inherently
cap ab le of judging the justice of the law a s well a s th e fact.
T he second section will exam ine the American experience of the trial by
jury p ro cess from the American Revolution to date. This experience illustrates
that while this segm ent of the political p ro cess h a s b een m anipulated by the
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judicial branch of the state, the inherent pow er of the individual serving a s a juror
h as not yet been eradicated.

English P reced en t
T he philosophical foundation for th e social and econom ic order that cam e
to be under the Constitution of the United S ta te s is found in the "unanim ous
Declaration of the thirteen united S ta te s of America". Commonly known a s the
Declaration of Independence, this docum ent s e t before th e rest of th e world the
rationale for the separation of the colonies from G reat Britain. Logic dictates
that the argum ent u sed by the colonies to justify their separation from Britain
must also be the argum ent used to justify any governm ent to be estab lish ed by
th e se sam e colonies.
The second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence contains the
founding fathers' rationale for the p u rp o se of establishing governm ent. The
power d eleg ated to governm ent originates with the citizens' Creator, who
endow s them with inalienable rights. A mongst th e se are the th ree basic rights of
life, liberty and the pursuit of h appin ess-th e keys to securing all other rights. In
order to sec u re th e se rights according to the laws of nature and natu re's God,
men form into community and institute governm ent. The sole purpose of this
governm ent, then, is to secu re th e se inalienable rights of the individuals
consenting to be governed. T h e se individuals now have a vested interest in the
activities of their governm ent and a duty to participate in the establishm ent of the
order in which they will abide.

T he term s of the resulting contract can b e inferred through custom and/or
tradition or ex p ressed in a constitution. It follows then, that w hen governm ent
voids the social contract and no longer functions a s a protector of individual
rights--as had the governm ent of G eorge III-- th o se consenting to the
established governm ent must declare that breech, abolish the existing
governm ent, and institute a new one.
Within this "unanim ous Declaration of th e thirteen united S ta te s of
America" is a long list of grievances which the colonists believed to be
insufferable to the point that they determ ined "it is their right, and it is their duty,
to throw off such governm ent and to provide new guards for their future
security."2 This list of grievances consisted of violations of th e rights of man
guaranteed to British subjects (colonist included) by the M agna C arta (1215) and
by the English Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689. The M agna C arta limited
the kings authority and w as the first docum ent to g u aran tee a trial by a jury of
ones peers. The English Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689 g u aran teed
individual rights that w ere considered to b e "true, ancient, and indubitable rights
and liberties of the people"3 of the English kingdom along with limiting the
taxation pow ers of the king and the m aintenance of a standing army. The
colonists' claim to th e se rights had b een estab lish ed through m any y ears of
custom and tradition a s British subjects.
T he Declaration also sta te s that "prudence dictates governm ents long
established should not change for light and transient c au se s".4 Therefore, the
rights and privileges of individuals being a b u se d and usurped by Britain m ust

have been held in such high esteem by the colonists that to suffer the loss of
th e se rights w as considered by them to be unjustifiable, thereby justifying the
revolution that w as now inevitable. It w as inevitable b e c a u se th e relationship
betw een the governed and the governing institution (British m onarch through
Parliam ent) w as modified by that governing institution, to such an extent that the
social contract no longer functioned; Britain had voided the contract.
The issu e s identified in the list of grievances in the Declaration of
Independence acknow ledge the th ree parties involved in establishing the
recognized social order of the colonies. O ne party is the created state (British
"King in Parliament", the perpetrators of the ab u ses), a seco n d party is the
community (the colonies, injured through econom ic hardships suffered by
colonial society on the whole), and the third party is the individuals making up
that community (citizens being deprived of individual rights without d u e pro cess
b e c a u se of the abuses). The recognition of th e se three distinct political
com ponents is important b e c a u se it recognizes the right of the individual to
participate in politics, determining limits on governm ent activities, and defines
citizenship for the individual a s the activity n ecessary for creating and
maintaining th e se limits. That political role w as being violated, am ong other
ways, by taxation without representation, and the deprivation of a trial by a juiy
of o n e 's peers.
Brought into the political p ro cess by Henry II at C larendon in 1166, trial by
jury w as quickly assim ilated into the standard English justice system . Henry's
primary motivation w as to w rest power aw ay from the m anor courts adm inistered
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by the Barons, thereby increasing th e power of the king. In order to entice
litigants to the king's court Henry initiated what he thought to b e the b e st justice
system at th e time, a trial by jury—albeit th e king's jury. Guinter in his book, The
Jury in America, identifies the two singular virtues of Henry's juries.
Although Henry left no writings to explain his reasoning, w e can
infer from his other political and judicial actions at the time that h e must
have se e n that a jury system would have two singular virtues. First, since
it would give people the c h an ce to help decide their own affairs, its
p re se n c e w as likely to add to the popular support he w as seeking for his
royal courts over the baronial ones: secondly, and at least a s importantly,
th e jury would provide a justice-dispensation method which th e church
could not readily control 5
Henry's justice system cam e to be so highly regarded that the m onarchs of
Castile an d N avarre c h o se to have H enry's ju d g es settle a border dispute for
them.
By 1215 som e two generations later trial by jury w as d em an d ed a s a
basic right of an Englishman w hen th e B arons overpow ered the king and forced
him to sign the M agna Carta. This docum ent limited the king's pow er by
recognizing the rights of an Englishman. The M agna C arta m akes mention of
trial by jury several tim es (chapters 10,40,52 and 39). C hapter 39, written by the
Barons in their own self-interest limited the concept of trial by jury to a jury of
o n e's peers. C hapter 39 states:
No freem an, shall be taken or/and imprisoned or d isseised or exiled or in
any way destroyed, nor will we [the king] go upon him nor sen d upon him,
except by the lawful judgm ent of his p e ers or/and by th e law of th e land.6
Though written to provide for them selves a jury m ade up of barons a s a
protection from the king, once again, th e p ro cess of trial by jury w as expedient
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for political p urposes but w as argued a s an entitlem ent for all "freemen". For the
period of time betw een the close of th e thirteenth century w hen Edward declared
that trial by jury be considered part of the English common law and B ushel's
c a s e in 1670, juries continued to o p erate under fear that the verdict they
returned would not be accep tab le to th e judge who would then issue a "writ of
attaint".
W hen a judge or som e other royal authority d isag reed with a jury verdict,
a writ of attaint (i.e., a claim that the verdict w as tainted) could b e issued and a
new jury of 24 sum m oned to reconsider the c a s e and try the original jurors for
perjury rising from their "false" verdict. Should th e seco n d jury decide the first
had done w rong-w hich usually m eant it decided that bribery had taken p la c e th e punishm ent m eted out to the attainted jurors could be a heavy one. As sir
John Fortesque sum m arized in 1470: "All of th e first jury shall be committed to
the King's prison, their goods shall be confiscated, their p o sse ssio n s seized into
the King's hands, their habitations and h o u ses shall b e pulled down, their
w oodland shall be felled, their m eadow s shall be plowed up and they th em selves
forever thenceforw ard be e ste e m ed in the eye of th e law infam ous7
In addition to the "writ of attaint", jurors also had to contend with the fear
of possible prosecution in a special court of the king known a s th e Court of S tar
C ham ber. Initiated in 1487 this special court claim ed exclusive jurisdiction over
felonies such a s forgery, perjury, rioting, fraud, libel, conspiracy and political
crimes. Jurors who decided against the Crown often found them selves being
indicted in the Court of S tar C h am b er-n o t under British law, but by m ethods
similar to the Spanish Inquisition.8
After losing a bout with the crown a s to the superiority of the Common
P le a s courts (common law) over the C hancery courts, Sir Edward Coke (15521634), the m ost highly regarded common law jurist, gave up his position on the
Common P leas bench in order to be elected to Parliam ent. O nce elected he
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facilitated the elimination of the Court of the S tar Cham ber. This sam e
Parliam ent then resurrected the M agna C arta a s a guarantor of the rights of all
Englishmen, and declared that Parliam ent be the lawmaking body superior to
both common law and C hancery (equity) courts. W hile Edward Coke
cham pioned the Common Law his motive h ere had m ore to do with v en g ean ce
for the decision m ade by Sir Francis Bacon to place the C hancery Courts over
th e Common P leas Courts rather than building th e foundation of individual moral
authority through the jury process. However, this later c o n seq u en ce w as soon to
happen.
T he catalyst for the final ch an g e in th e jury p ro c e ss beg an with th e arrest
of a young man by the nam e of William Penn and his com panion C harles M ead
under the Conventicle Act. T he Conventicle Act (1660) w as intended to provide
sp ee d y rem edies for any seditious action; particularly any action involving w hat
could be construed a s insurrection against the Church of England. P enn and
M ead, both Q uakers, w ere a cc u sed under this law of "seditiously" causing a
tumult. Prosecution under statutory law, the Conventicle Act, would result in a
fine which both young men could easily afford; prosecution under the "common
law" of unlawful assem bly could lead to jail se n te n c e s .9 N eedless to say the
young men w ere to be tried under common law. However, the way in which the
charge w as written m ade it evident that it w as th e Conventicle Act under which
they w ere being tried.
After hearing the ev idence-testim o n y of th ree men who claimed to have
s e e n Penn preaching but w ere too far away to h e ar what he w as saying--the jury
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w as given their charge. After 90 m inutes the jury stood eight to four for
conviction. Edward Bushel upon being recognized by an alderm an a s one of the
possible holdouts received this adm onishm ent: "You d e se rv e to b e indicted more
than any man that hath been brought to the bar this day." The judge then added
the threat of branding the recalcitrant jurors.10
W hen the jury returned from further consideration it returned with one
verdict:
William Penn, they said w as "guilty of speaking in G racechurch Street."
That w as not what the judges w anted to hear. They couldn't sen d anyone
to prison for that. "W as it not an unlawful assem bly?" d em anded the
judge. "You m ean he w as speaking to a tumult of people there."
T he forem an of the jury replied: "My Lord, this w as all I had in
com m ission."11

D isregarding further threats of detainm ent and starvation this jury
continued to find Penn and Mead not guilty. Unable to force a verdict th e judge
returned Penn and M ead to their jail cells and fined each of th e twelve jurors 40
marks. W hen the jurors refused to pay they also w ere imprisoned. It w as 1670
and th e se twelve jurors w ere about to put the "writ of attaint" to rest. C ast into
Newgate Prison, eight of the twelve jurors eventually paid their fines and were
released. T he remaining four retained lawyers to argue their c a s e (Bushel's
C ase). After a year of litigation the fining and imprisonment of this jury w as
declared illegal. More importantly, however, w as the finding by th e Chief Justice
that no jury can be punished for its verdict.
Bushel and his colleagues--m en otherw ise anonym ous but
distinguished in the history of fre e d o m -h a d m ade it possible

for all juries that cam e after them to render their verdicts
without fear and a s they, not th e judge, saw the equities.
T he jury of o ne's p e ers that th e barons had provided had at
last becom e what the barons never w anted it to be, a
dem ocratic parliam ent of tw elve.12
B ushel's C ase is important in itself for the role it played in eliminating the
"writ of attaint". W hen coupled with the litigation which called this jury into
being, the importance is magnified. By not rendering the verdict called for by the
court this jury took on the moral authority to determ ine that the law ,the
Conventicle Act, under which Penn and Mead w ere being prosecuted did not
apply in this case.
As the English colonies w ere established in North America their charters
and governing docum ents provided for the right to trial by jury. The First C harter
of Virginia (1606) extended the rights of an English subject to the colonists. King
J a m e s I's Instruction for the G overnm ent of the Colony of Virginia specifically
m entioned the right to a jury trial.13

T he American Experience
By the time of the American Revolution the p ro c e ss of trial by jury in the
colonies had evolved to en ab le the jurors to judge the law a s well a s the facts. 14
This right w as granted to jurors in M assach u setts in 1641, repealed and
regranted by enactm ents in 1642, 1657, and 1660.15 T he oath adm inistered to
jurors in M assachusetts incorporated instructions cautioning them to deliver their
verdict "according to law and the evidence given you."16
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In c a s e s decided in 1692, 1764, 1767 an d 1773 in Pennsylvania, it w as
held that jurors had this right to determ ine both law and fact.17 A review of c a s e s
that w ere argued in Pennsylvania in 1784 found opposing counsel argued
different law and the jury w as charged to m ake up its own mind a s to which w as
correct.18 There w as only one judge in the United S tates betw een 1776 and 1800
that denied juries the right to decide law a s well a s fact. He w as afterward
im peached by the H ouse of R epresentatives of Pennsylvania and rem oved by
the Pennsylvania S e n a te .19 In 1790 Pennsylvania provided by constitutional
provision that "in all indictments for libels th e jury shall have a right to determ ine
the law and the facts under the direction of th e court, a s in other c ase s."20 The
duty of the jury resulting from this direction to determ ine th e law and the facts is
to determ ine the applicability of the law in light of the facts specific to th e case.
Often the jury b ecam e aw are of their right to determ ine both law and fact
indirectly a s w as the c a s e in the John P eter Z en g er trial (1735). In this c a s e
jurors w ere informed of their right to decide th e law a s well a s the facts through
closing argum ents. Zenger, a New York n ew sp ap er printer, w as charged with
libel against the royal governor of New York. T he judge m ade it clear that the
jurors could only decide the facts; in this c a s e that am ounted to w hether or not
Z enger did in fact print the article. It w as to b e a sim ple c a s e with the jury
returning a verdict for the king. However, Z en g er's attorney argued that if the
story w as true then the w ords could not be held libelous. The presiding judge
positioned himself by stating that "a libel is not to b e justified; for it is
nevertheless a libel that it is true"21; reserving th e right to decide the law a s to
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what constitutes libel to himself. In the closing argum ents Z en g er's lawyer,
Andrew Hamilton p re sse d the jury to determ ine th e truth of the facts presented.
T he chief justice interrupted Hamilton's closing argum ent reminding him
that the jury:
"May find that Mr. Z enger printed and published th o se papers, and leave
it to the court to judge w hether they a re libelous. You know this is very
common; it is in the nature of a special verdict, w here the jury leave the
m atter of law to the Court."
Hamilton's reply to the judge at this point informed Z en g er's jurors of their
right to determ ine the law.
"I know, may it p le ase your honour, they may do so;
but I do likewise know they may do otherwise. I know they
have the right, beyond all dispute, to determ ine both the law
and the fact, and w here they have no doubt of the law, they
ought to do so....
Hamilton continued to the jury:
"A proper confidence in a court is com endable; but th e verdict (w hatever it
is) will be yours, you ought to refer to part of your duty to the discretion of
th e se persons. If you should be of opinion that there is no falsehood in
Mr. Z enger's papers, you will, nay (pardon m e for the expression) you
ought to say so.... It is the best cause; it is th e c a u se of liberty."22
W hen th e jury returned with a not guilty verdict it w as much m ore than a
victory for freedom of the press. Z en g er's trial set precedent for the jury's right
to nullify law since the judge did not stop Hamilton from arguing the question
even though he did not concede to the right.
Thus, trial by jury w as recognized by the founding fathers a s som ething
more than a m ere judicial process. It w as understood to be the p ro cess by which
individuals m aintained the public morality through exertion of their moral
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authority (the original power of the individual to establish governm ent) in
determining w hat actions of governm ent w ere to be considered lawful.
The colonist could not be m ade to suffer the hardships put on them by
Britain through various legislation a s long a s they m aintained their individual
rights; for no jury would convict anyone tried under th o se laws. G uinther (1988)
notes th e im portance of the trial by jury a s a political power betw een 1764 and
1776:
A denial of the right to jury helped force that revolution into
existence. The stag e w as se t through the p a ss a g e by Parliam ent of the
Stam p Act of 1764, a tax on p a p er that w as considered a form of
censorship by many new spap er publishers. It proved difficult to enforce.
To gain convictions of violators, th e British governm ent switched
prosecutions under the statu te from th e Common P leas to the Admiralty
courts w here, a s in Chancery,juries--which would have freed the Stam p
Act p ro te sto rs-w ere not permitted. The Stam p Act C ongress, held in
New York in 1765, specifically condem ned this abrogation of th e jury trial,
but Parliam ent, at least initially, w as unim pressed by the com plaints.23
According to Scheflin and Van Dyke (1980) juries for much of the
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries w ere frequently told that they
had the right and power to reject the ju d g e's view of the law.24 Howe (1939)
o bserves that in the period soon after th e constitutional convention juries had
the right to determ ine both law and fact. R ules of evidence w ere either loose or
nonexistent, and the control of the judge over courtroom procedure w as
apparently limited to preventing m ayhem .25 Provine (1986) provides one
rationale for such jury power; that is, very little distinguished the lay jurors from
the equally lay judge.26
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The newly formed U.S. Suprem e Court se t im pressive legal p reced en ts
defining the jury's power. G eorgia v. Brailsford (1794), a civil c a s e being heard
under the original jurisdiction of the Suprem e Court, se t precedent w hen Chief
Justice John Jay sitting a s a trial judge advised the jury that they should take the
law from the court:
"But it m ust be observed that by th e sam e law, which
recognizes this reaso n ab le distribution of jurisdiction, you
have, nevertheless, a right to take upon yourselves to judge
of both, and to determ ine the law a s well a s the fact in
controversy."27
Bingham v. C abot (1794) drew a similar opinion of the jury's power
from justices Ja m e s Iredell and Jam es W ilson.28 This principle of
jury justice w as ad h ered to w henever prosecution for seditious libel
under the Sedition Law of 1798 cam e before the courts.
T he broad support shown for the juries' right to decide law
and fact in the late 1700's continued into th e nineteenth century. In
M assachusetts a s late a s 1829,
the jury w as thought to be a partner in a joint enterprise with
the judge, with resp ect to determ inations of law and fact;
judge-jury co-operation w as the rule in both a re a s .29
Succinctly put in Commonwealth v. Childs (1829), "the law
presum es intelligence in the jury."30
However, a s the nineteenth century p rogressed, the juries'
right to consider the equities of the law gradually eroded. Horowitz
and W ellging (1991) attribute this to the increasing professionalism
of jurists, and the courts' reaction to the muzzling of trial judges at
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the turn of the 19th century.31 The direct and special verdicts a s
well a s the special interrogatories w ere judicially developed to
curtail the juries' power to decide questions of law.32 Evidence of
such developm ent can be found in th e M assach u setts c a s e s of
Commonwealth v. Porter (1845) and C h ase v. Breed (1855),
culminating in Commonwealth v. Merrill (1860).33
T he first attack on the juries' pow er cam e in 1845. In
Commonwealth v. Porter (1845) Chief Justice Shaw arg u es that:
"The constitutional g u aran tee of a trial before an impartial judge under
standing laws would be violated if the jury w ere allowed to decide
questions of law."34
C h ase v. Breed (1855) and Commonwealth v. Packard (1855) both su g g est a
move toward the directed verdict.35 Finally, in Commonwealth v. Merrill (1860)
"the court held for the first time that a directed verdict is m andatory w hen the
evidence is legally insufficient."36 T he courts decision to uphold th e u se of
directed verdicts led to the M assach u setts legislature adopting a statute that
explicitly gave juries the power to determ ine both th e law and fact.
T he concept of natural justice which prevailed in the first half of the
century w as the foundation for the argum ents against the directed verdict. The
legislature's argum ents that the jury had the right to decide law included two
positions. T he first position being that the jury could respond to a higher law
which would allow the jury to reach its conclusion of th e b asis of natural law
considered to be more truly just. T he seco n d position being that the jury is
qualified to determ ine the contents of the positive law, using the relatively simple

17
and understandable common law which is closely related in principle to the
natural law.37 T he state of Indiana also adopted a similar statute at this time.
Scheflin and Van Dyke (1980) attribute the curtailment of jury rights to the
notion that leading ju dges did not think that a jury could be permitted to mitigate
the law without also being able to create harsh and vindictive laws.38 Scheflin
and Van Dyke illustrate their point by citing United S tates v. Battiste (1835).
This c a s e concerns the application of an 1820 statute that provided the death
penalty for any American citizen who should "seize any negro or mulatto" with
the intent of making the person a slave. T he defendant had b een a sailor on a
ship that transported slav es from P o rtu g u ese Africa. Two q uestions of
interpretation of th e law had to be resolved: (1) w hether the statu te applied to
sailors who gained no title over slav es and no profit from their sale; and (2)
w hether it applied to the transportation of slav es betw een two points within a
country practicing slavery. Suprem e Court Justice, Jo sep h Story, sitting a s the
presiding trial judge answ ered both questions with a "no". His concern in limiting
the jurors to his interpretation of the law and to decide the facts only w as that he
did not w ant the jurors to convict the defendant for an act that th e legislature did
not intend to criminalize. While Justice Story's position runs contrary to the
power of juries determ ining the law, it is in fact congruent with th e spirit of the
nullification issue; that the nullification pow er b e u sed w henever the jury h a s an
inclination to show mercy.39 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 led to direct
confrontation in th e issue of jury independence. T he Fugitive Slave Act w as
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difficult to enforce b e c a u se so many people w ere o p p o sed to the law that juries
habitually acquitted in c a s e s of obvious violation. In United S ta te s v. Morris
(1851) Ju stice Benjamin R. Curtis, presiding trial judge, disallow ed the counsel
for the defendant to argue that if the jurors:
Conscientiously believed th e Fugitive Slave Act to be unconstitutional
then they w ere bound by their oath to disregard any direction to the
contrary which the court might give them.
Curtis concluded that:
T he jury have the power to go contrary to the law a s decided by the court;
but that power is not the right, is plain, when we consider that they also
have the like power to go contrary to the evidence, which they are sworn
not to do.40
Ju stice Curtis continues by explaining that if jurors w ere permitted to
decide questions of law, then they could overturn decisions of the Suprem e
Court. T he purpose of the 1802 statu te (which m akes Suprem e Court decisions
final) would be subverted and uniform interpretation of the law would be
im possible.41
T he decisions m ade individually by Ju stices Story and Curtis w ere u sed
extensively w hen the question of what jurors should be told about their power
cam e before th e Suprem e Court in 1895. T he jurors for Sparf and H ansen v. the
United S ta te s (1895) w ere trying to discern if they could find the men guilty of
m anslaughter rather than m urder even though th ere w as no evidence to sustain
that charge. In re sp o n se to the jury's req u est for additional instructions to be
given by the judge the court stated that:
In a proper case, the verdict for m anslaughter may b e rendered,... and
even in this c a s e you have the physical power to do so; but a s one of the
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tribunals of the country, a jury is expected to b e governed by law, and th e law it
should receive from the court.42
T he defendants ap p ealed to the Suprem e Court arguing that the jury had b een
improperly instructed. T he Suprem e Court clearly decided that jurors m ust take
the law from the judge and may not substitute their own beliefs of w hat the law
should be. However, they did not a d d re ss the specific question w hether jurors
should be told they can refuse to enforce the law's h a rsh n ess w hen justice so
requires.
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The courts continued to consistently recognize the power th e jury held in
determining c a s e s according to conscience-nullifying law -b u t th e issu e of what
to tell the jury concerning this power rem ained moot until the latter half of the
twentieth century. The high acquittal rate in prohibition c a s e s during th e 1920's
and 1930's w as a good indication that prohibition laws could not be enforced.
According to Scheflin the repeal of th o se laws can be traced to th e pow er of the
juries to refuse to convict th o se accu sed of alcohol traffic even w hen the
defendant a p p ea re d to be guilty.44 In 1949 the U.S. Court of A ppeals for the
Ninth Circuit noted,
The jury h a s alw ays exercised the pardoning power, notwithstanding the
law, which is their actual prerogative.45
U nderstanding this jury's power to nullify and its decision not to in this case,
provided further support for the Ninth Circuit Court of A ppeals to uphold the
conviction.46 By the 1960's however, w hen the D epartm ent of Ju stice decided
to move against political activists (Vietnam w ar protestors) the issu e of th e jury's
right to be informed of their power to d ecide th e c a s e b a se d on co n scien ce w as
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no longer moot. T he forum for the d e b ate w as United S ta te s v. Dougherty
(1972). This c a s e involved nine m em bers of the Catholic clergy who broke into
Dow Chem ical Com pany offices and ran sack ed the prem ises to protest Dow's
m anufacture of napalm . The d efen d an ts req u ested a jury nullification instruction
at the trial but the request w as refused. On appeal, the U.S. Court of A ppeals
upheld, by a two-to-one vote, the trial ju d g e's refusal to give the nullification
instruction.47
Ju d g e Harold Leventhal writing for the majority a sse rte d that jurors know
of their prerogative to decide the c a s e b a se d on conscience through "informal
communication from the total culture" (so u rces such a s television, literature,
new spapers etc.).48 He feared that if jurors w ere told of their power to nullify,
they may react and thereby radically u p set an institution that functioned best
when functioning informally. Chief Ju d g e David Bazelon wrote the dissenting
opinion, condem ning the inconsistent view that glorifies nullification a s
enhancing the "over-all normative effect of th e rule of law",49 while requiring that
the nullification power be concealed from jurors and p erh ap s even denounced in
their p re sen c e--a s had been done in Dougherty.50 It is interesting to note that the
nullification d e fe n se w as allowed four y ears later when twenty-eight Vietnam
W ar protestors went on trial in Cam den, New Jersey for destroying draft records.
All twenty-eight w ere acquitted even though the FBI caught them inside the draft
offices destroying records. Today the right of the jury to act a s a check on the
state exists a s it did two hundred y ears ago. The individual juror h as the
inherent pow er and duty a s an individual to determ ine the justice of the law a s
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well a s the facts. However, the manipulation of this power by the judicial system,
coupled with d ecreasing knowledge of our unique political heritage h a s left the
citizen ignorant of his statu s in the political a re n a with respect to carrying out his
duties a s a juror.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE ETHICS OF
THE JURY NULLIFICATION
INSTRUCTION

As w e traced the history of the trial by jury p ro cess in ch ap ter two from its
English origins through the American experience we found that the trial by jury
p ro cess h a s alw ays played a political function in the adm inistration of the law.
Both th e U.S. S e n a te and the U.S. H ouse of R epresentatives in sep a ra te
com m ittee reports prior to the approval of th e Federal Jury Selection Act of 1968
articulated their recognition of the political function of the trial by jury process: "it
must be rem em bered that the jury is d esig n ed not only to u n d erstan d the case,
but also to reflect the community's s e n s e of injustice in deciding it".1
T he goal of this chapter is to determ ine if it is a n ethical practice for the
courts, who recognize the political function of the trial by jury pro cess, to
disallow jurors knowledge of their power to act a s moral a g en ts in checking
governm ent activity through the nullification power of the jury, "the right of jurors
to refuse to enforce the law ag ain st d efendants whom they believe in good
co nscience should be acquitted".2 T he nullification pow er of the jury "empowers
jurors to appeal to fundam ental principles of justice over and ab o v e th e written
law."3 A juror know ledgeable about this right is referred to a s a "fully informed
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juror". A "Fully Informed Jury Amendment" (FIJA) would m ake it m andatory for
ju dges to include information about this jury right in their instructions to the jury.
I plan to m eet this goal by examining the dual role of the trial by jury
p ro cess through H obbes's u se of the term s “justice” and “equity” a s the b asis of
his political arena. A distinction betw een law and legalism will be m ade and
their relationship to justice and equity will be established. T he relationship
betw een the individual citizen and the concepts of law and legalism, equity and
justice will be drawn to indicate that the individual citizen bound by the principles
of equity and lawfulness, is the originator of the law and therefore the only moral
authority cap ab le of determining equity and dispensing justice. The subordinate
position of the state in relation to the people within th e political order will b e the
final prem ise in support of my conclusion, that any state preventing individual
citizens from using their inherent capacity to reaso n and act equitably, acts in an
unethical m anner. Therefore it is an unethical practice not to acknow ledge a
juror's right to act according to conscience. Prohibiting the nullification
instruction prevents a juror from acting in accordance with his/her moral
prerogative.

Dual Function of the Trial by Jury P ro cess
T he e s s e n c e of the dual nature of the trial by jury p ro cess is to
sim ultaneously serve both justice and equity. In order to do this the jury
sim ultaneously c reates two distinct objectives, one which I shall refer to a s the
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'justice objective’ is m aintained on an individual b asis and the other, which I shall
refer to a s the ‘equity objective’ is m aintained on a societal level.
The political function of the jury serving the 'justice objective’ is to
determ ine if an individual m em ber of society h a s m aintained th e legalities of the
law. The specifics of the c a s e a s to th e truth and probability of evidence are
exam ined and if one or more acts by th e a cc u sed a re found to b e outside of the
param eters of what the conscience of the community accepts a s docum ented in
written law, then, it is the duty of the jury to determ ine that violation and what
d e g re e of punishm ent should be used ag ain st the individual.
The political function of the jury serving the ‘equity objective’ is to
determ ine if the positive law (law that is estab lish ed and recognized by
governm ental authority) a s interpreted by the officials of the state, reflects the
natural law a s interpreted by the citizens of the community. Every time a jury
a cts upon a specific se t of circum stances it ev alu ates the so u n d n ess of the
positive law a s an expression of the natural law, establishing the param eters of
w hat the community determ ines to be lawful in that circum stance.
Citizens cannot be released from th e political duties of the jury due to the
self-legislating nature of equity and lawfulness. Equity and law fulness are selflegislating in the s e n s e that both equity and lawfulness in and of them selves
obligate one to a course of action that m ust be m aintained in order for equity and
lawfulness to exists. It is this nature that binds citizens to a course of action that
neither judicial policy nor legislation can eliminate. Socrates rem inds his jurors
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that they have this obligation to determ ine both law (including the legal) and
equity (including justice) w hen he states:
T he jury d o es not sit to d isp en se justice a s a favour, but to decide w here
justice lies; and the oath which they have sworn is not to show favour at
their own discretion, but to return a just and lawful verdict. It follows that
we m ust not develop in you, nor you allow to grow in yourselves, th e habit
of perjury; that would be sinful for us both...I leave it to you and to God to
judge me a s it shall be b e st for me and for yourselves.4
S ocrates' appeal to his jurors to avoid perjuring th em selves while
deliberating his fate implies that they have a duty to act according to a higher
law and that to stray from that co u rse of action that higher law s e ts out for them
com prom ises their integrity. S o crates entrusts his jurors and God to judge him
with equity--"as it shall be b e st for m e and for yourselves."5

The Self-Legislating Nature of Equity,
Justice, Lawfulness and Legality
W eb ster's Ninth New C ollegiate Dictionary defines lawfulness a s that
which is "constituted, authorized, or established by law (natural, divine, common
or canon)". It distinguishes lawfulness from legal within its definition, stating that
"legal” applies to what is sanctioned by the law or in conformity with the law,
especially a s it is written or adm inistered by the courts."
Natural law, a s defined by Cicero, is w hat individuals arrive at a s a result
of the "highest reasoning".
Law (lex) is the highest reaso n , fixed in nature, which com m ands w hat is
to be done, and prohibits the opposite. That reason, w hen it is
established and fulfilled in th e mind of man, is law. Accordingly they think
that law is the wisdom w hose force would lie in commanding to act rightly
and forbidding to do wrong.
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Since nothing is better than reason, and since it is both in man and in
God, the fellowship of reaso n is the first thing man s h a re s with God. But
th o se who sh a re reaso n also sh a re a common right reason. And since
the latter is law, we must su p p o se that men are asso ciated with th e gods
also in law. Furthermore, th o se who have a community of law (lex), have
also a community of right (ius); and th o se who have th e se things in
common, are to be held a s of th e sam e State. And it is much m ore so if in
fact they obey the sam e authority an d powers; but they do obey this
heavenly order and divine mind of god of superior power; so that this
whole world is to be regarded a s one common S tate of g o d s and m en.6
Cicero identifies reason a s a divine part of the nature of man; man being
subjected to the divine authority then, is also subjected to his reason, which
each of us sh a re with others and with the gods.
It is, however, in his De Legibus that Cicero m akes his distinctive
contribution. Identifying "right reason" with th o se qualities of hum an
nature w hereby "man is asso ciated with th e gods," he there a ssig n s the
binding quality of the civil law itself to its being in harm ony with such
universal attributes of hum an nature. In the natural endow m ent of man,
and especially his social traits, "is to b e found the true so u rce of laws and
rights," he a sse rts, and later says, "We a re born for justice and right is not
the m ere arbitrary construction of opinion, but an institution of nature."
H ence justice is not, a s the E picureans claim, m ere utility, for "that which
is established on account of utility may for utilities sa k e b e overturned."
T here is, in short, discoverable in the perm anent elem en ts of hum an
nature itself a durable justice which tra n sce n d s expediency, and the
positive law m ust em body this if it is to claim the allegiance of the human
co nscience.7
Corwin recognized the relationship estab lish ed betw een reaso n and the
"suprem e power" a s the source of "higher law" for American constitutional law
(positive law). He credits Cicero for recognizing the self-legislating (directing a
course of action n e ce ssa ry to maintain in order for existence) a sp e c t of natural
law b ased not only on its connection to the divine, but also on th e divine’s
reflection in man. This reflection is the e s s e n c e of justice in hum an nature.
Justice is neither arbitrary nor expendable, it is a perm anent natural right of man
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providing the binding qualities of civil law. In other words, justice requires a
certain course of action be taken by man if justice is to exist.
The translators of Cicero u se the term ‘positive law' to describe the
em bodim ent of right reasoning in written form for all to know. H obbes u s e s the
term "artificial law" to describe this sam e concept of written law embodying
"natural law".
As Cicero m ade a divine connection in order to align positive and natural
law on a moral spectrum for the Hellenistic philosophers, H obbes d o es so for the
R en a issa n c e and early m odern philosophers. Art to them w as "God's way in
nature, an d therefore, it [the artificial] is m an's way to build within nature so a s to
bring natural beginnings to their best possible fruition by admixture of m an's
labor and skill."8 The em p h asis on the skill and labor in the making of the
artificial is important. T he artificial thing is not m ade lightly a s a substitute for
the natural, but m eant to reflect the natural a s purely a s possible within the
nature of that by which it is m ade. Artificial law is crafted with language and will
only be a s effective a s the language allows.
H obbes, like the classical philosophers, recognizes two types of law,
natural and artificial. Natural laws or lawfulness, a re really "theorems" of natural
re a so n which we se e k in order to live in p e ac e and becom e individuals
(technically they are not law until acted upon in a public m anner).9
Artificial law or legalism, by com parison, is th e result of men coming
together in covenant and creating an artificial entity, the public. This public
requires an artificial person to act a s its agent, taking on all th e capacities of a
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real person including that of right reasoning i.e. public logic.10 It is the duty of
this public person then, to state w hat is the public logic i.e., "how we a g re e to
u se words in conversation (c)[and] m ust include agreem ent about good and evil
on those m atters which make and dissolve fundam ental social bonds. Privileged
definitions or u s a g e s cannot be allowed in th e se m atters."11 Artificial law should
reflect the natural law to the extent of th e public logic. Artificial law can becom e
obsolete a s the public logic develops or it can becom e broader and more
encom passing or narrow er and more limiting a s the language changes.
Therefore a n eed exists for constant checking to en su re that th e artificial d o es in
fact reflect the natural.
Lawfulness and legalism, the real and the artificial a re dual guideposts to
m an's interactions. Lawfulness is b a se d on m an's ability to reaso n that w hatever
is good for himself is also good for others. He extends to others th o se rights he
w ishes to claim for himself when he e n ters into a social covenant (society): "we
dem and no right against others we do not grant others ag ain st us"12.
Lawfulness according to H obbes is ad h ered to b e c a u se of its equitable
nature founded in reason. H obbes's u s e of the term "equity" w as unique in that it
transform ed the classical definition of fairn ess and equality in b u sin ess dealings
resulting from som e other moral prerogative to being a moral prerogative in
itself. For H obbes equity w as no longer merely a rem edy for an injustice; equity
becam e the re a so n for just actions and subsequently the foundation for
lawfulness and legalism.
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For H obbes and Aristotle a s for many others equity is that to which
appeal is m ade in the interpretation or "correction” or supplem enting of
the letter of the law. That to which ap p eal is m ade in equity has,
however, becom e a very different thing for H obbes. As we have se e n
Aristotelian equity is a correction of th e just a s the lawful which s e e k s to
do a s the lawgiver himself would have done w ere he faced with the
circum stances under which the law he devised now o p erates.... For
H obbes, on the other hand, equity is at on ce that to which appeal is m ade
in the interpretation of the laws, a stan d ard for the perform ance of the
sovereign's office, and 'th a t habit by which w e allow equality of n ature’.
As the interpreter of law is allowed or even required to su p p o se alw ays
that the legislator intended equity, the appeal to equity becom es an
appeal to what h a s b e en called 'natural public law'. Equity is no m ere
“com plem ent” or perfection of the just a s the lawful; it is rather the very
foundation of justice a s the lawful.13
C lassical Aristotelian equity is "a correction to legal justice" w hen the
"error w as not in the law or the legislator but in th e nature of the thing".14
C lassical equity w as called upon when the legal justice system failed in specific
situations due to the universality of th e law. Equity in the Aristotelian s e n s e is
not a stan d ard in itself but a tool allowing for th e correction of artificial or legal
justice in order to achieve natural justice which is the m andating standard. O ne
classical exam ple of Aristotelian equity is the "grandfather clause", a clau se
creating an exemption b a se d on circum stances previously existing.
In contrast to Aristotelian equity, H obbesian equity is a moral stan d ard in
itself and becom es the foundation for lawfulness and subsequently legalism.
H obbes saw equity in a way which w as inconsistent with common law (which
relied on classical equity to repair injustices). But th e se injustices would never
have occurred under law founded upon H obbesian equity. Mathie sum m arizes
H obbes's concept of equity in relation to the comm on law a s follows:
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As unwritten law can b e nothing other than the law of nature a s
determ ined by reaso n or equity, no custom or presum ption in law can
establish a s law w hatever is contrary to equity.15
H obbesian equity g e n erate s justice, law fulness and that which is legal.
Aristotelian equity is som ething in addition to that which is legal in order to
achieve an equitable resu lt-ju stice a s prescribed by the law.
It [equity] is not better than justice in th e s e n s e that it belongs to a
different and better gen u s than justice. The just thing to which the
equitable thing is superior, is th e lawfully just thing, i.e. th e equitable thing
is better than that which is just a s being in accord with the law.16
[em phasis added]
Legalism is the result of men coming to g eth er in equity to institutionalize
through the written word the conditions under which they relinquish their rights
for the sak e of living in peace. Legalism esta b lish e s the param eters by which
individuals refuse to allow society to infringe upon the liberties they have a s
individuals. W ritten law is expected to b e ad h ered to b a se d on th e principles of
justice--that all parties (real and artificial) concerned a g re e to the term s se t forth.
Since both parties, be they real or artificial (such a s the state), know the term s
of the written law there is no reaso n not to abide by the law other than to
perpetrate an injustice:
for 'injustice is no other than the not perform ance of covenant. And
w hatsoever is not unjust is just1.17
Taking th o se qualities which are instinctual, primitive and natural for man and
making them artificial [legal] through the p ro c e ss of right reasoning should make
th o se qualities better or n e ar perfect. Therefore, that which w as m ade artificial
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through the p ro c e ss of public logic should b e ad h ered to by th e public since
they, the public, a re the c a u se .18
It w as according to H obbes th e m istake of Aristotle to m ake natural
inequality a foundation of his political science; w hether men are equal by
nature or not they must be acknow ledged such, a s they are within
H obbes's own political teaching. Equity a s the habit of acknowledging
this natural equality, or dem anding a s o n e's own right only what o n e will
admit to be the right of others, beco m es the fundam ental moral virtue, a
rule for the guidance of public policy, and a powerful instrum ent for the
interpretation of law.19
Since Aristotle's politics is not b a se d on equality he m ust constantly
rem edy the laws and decisions on an a s-n e e d e d b asis according to privilege
and rank in the community in order to achieve equity. H obbes e stab lish es his
politics on equality disallowing for rank and privilege therefore his equity is a
standard in itself.
T he nature of equity and law a s well a s the origins of legalism and justice
provide individual citizens with two political obligations, both of which can be
fulfilled a s part of the jury deliberations in the trial by jury process. O ne is to
m ake certain that the written law is ad h ered to in the nam e of justice (Aristotle's
"distributive justice"). T he other is constantly to check that the written law d o es in
fact reflect natural law a s it is understood by th e community (in the nam e of
H obbesian equity). Determining both the law an d the facts in th e se w ays is what
a "Fully Informed Jury Amendment" would require a sitting jury to do, for it
allows citizens to exercise their right and fulfill their obligation to perform th e se
two checks on the law. It is the nature of equity and law and th e origins of
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legalism and justice in that nature that gives man the right to act a s the moral
authority in guiding the governm ent.

The Final Prem ise
T he United S tates w as estab lish ed by people who held the moral
prerogative of universal equity in the H obbesian sen se : and a belief in the rights
of the individual to extend only so far a s he grants his neighbor the sam e rights.
In order to e n su re their rights the people established an artificial entity, th e state,
to adm inister the a sp e c ts of living in unity. However, they reserved for
them selves the administration of the law through the republican form of
governm ent, and the reservation of the right to a trial by jury in order to have the
final say in all state activity.
T he United S tates w as brought into existence according to this seq u e n c e
a s evidenced in the Pream ble to the Constitution. The em phasis of the Pream ble
is that the state is subordinate to the people.
W e the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, insure dom estic tranquillity, provide for the
common defense, prom ote th e general welfare, and sec u re the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United S ta te s of America.20
Article III, Section II, P aragraph III of the Constitution g u aran teed the right
of trial by jury to the people. Many people feared losing this right to trial by jury
and actively cam paigned ag ain st the adoption of the Constitution unless a Bill of
Rights stating the rights of the individual in the political order being established
by the Constitution w as included. Patrick Henry, who y ears earlier spoke
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im passionately in favor of independence, spoke candidly about his fears of
losing the right to trial by jury.
But, Sir, I have strong c a u se of apprehension: In som e parts of the plan
before you, the great rights of freem en are endangered, in other parts
absolutely taken away. How d o e s your trial by jury stan d ? In civil c a s e s
g o n e -n o t sufficiently secured in crim inal-this best privilege is gone: But
we are told that we need not fear, b e c a u se th o se in pow er being our
R epresentatives, will not a b u se the pow ers we put in their hands: I am not
well versed in history, but I will submit to your recollection, w hether liberty
had b een destroyed most often by th e licentiousness of the people, or by
the tyranny of rulers.21
Henry, along with the many others, d em an d ed that the Constitution be further
defined in order to protect this "best privilege". This w as accom plished in the
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh A m endm ents of the Bill of Rights.
W hat m ade the right to trial by jury a "best privilege" w as th e tradition of
jurors being allowed to determ ine th e law a s well a s the facts (exactly w hat a
Fully Informed Jury Act would g u a ra n te e )-th e right to nullify law in certain
circum stances. This power, to check w hether state activity w as consistent with
the law, is what A lexander Hamilton referred to w hen he called th e right to trial
by jury "the very palladium of free governm ent".22 This sam e power is referred to
today a s the pow er of "jury nullification".
"The friends and ad v ersaries of the plan of the convention, if they
a g re e in nothing else, concur at least in the value they se t upon the trial
by jury; or if there is any difference betw een them it consists in this: the
former regard it a s a valuable safeg u ard to liberty; the latter rep resen t it
a s the very palladium of free governm ent."23
The statu s of the state a s being subordinate to the people in th e political
order established by the Constitution is critical to the argum ent in support of
FIJA b e c a u se a state w hose existence is subordinate to the people, a s the
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United S tates is, h as no authority to limit or influence the decision making
p ro cess of the people a s individuals or collectively a s "the public”. In a free
society b a se d on equity no one individual or state h a s privilege over another.
T he moral prerogative upon which the law of the United S tates is
b a se d is grounded in H obbesian equity. This is critical to the argum ent in
support of FIJA. Thom as Jefferson, writing for th e founding fathers,
explains this equity in term s of the universal equality of individuals a s to
their inalienable rights. T h e se rights are the sam e o n e s H obbes
ascertain s a s the first two laws of nature in Leviathan stem ming from the
basic right "jus naturale", the liberty each man hath, to u se his own power,
a s he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of
his own life;24
H obbes first law of nature is:
that every man h as right to every thing;
and his second law of nature is:
that a man be willing, w hen others are so too, a s far-forth, a s for peace,
and defence of himself h e shall think it n ecessary , to lay down this right to
all things; and be contented with so much liberty ag ain st other men, a s he
would allow other m en ag ain st himself.25
T h e se sam e H obbesian laws are re-iterated by Jefferson with th ese
words:
W e hold th e se truths to b e self-evident, that all men a re created
equal; that they are endow ed by their C reator with certain inalienable
rights; that am ong th ese, a re life, liberty and th e pursuit of happiness.
That to sec u re th e se rights, governm ents are instituted am ong men,
deriving their just pow ers from th e consent of th e governed.26

A detailed com parison betw een John Locke and T hom as H obbes is
outside the sco p e of this thesis, although an explanation is in order to justify
attributing Jefferson's concept of universal equality a s stated in th e Declaration
of Independence to H obbes rather than Locke. Traditionally w e asso ciate
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Jefferson's w ords with Locke rather than Hobbes. As Hartz stated, "a society
which begins with Locke, and thus transform s him, stay s with Locke, by virtue of
an absolute and irrational attachm ent it develops for him".27 Jefferson's thoughts
on m an's moral nature are considered eclectic in that he includes Stoic,
Christian, humanist, deist, Epicurean, utilitarian, agrarian, Enlightenment, social
contract, and natural rights co n cep ts.28
P eter Laslett in his introduction to the 1988 edition of the Two T reatises of
G overnm ent credits Locke with providing the political policy that H obbes'
Leviathan lacked.
It [Two T reatises of Government] contained just that ingredient
which Leviathan lacked-policy; statem ent of guidance of w hat men will
accept, respond to and pursue, allow ance for th e limits of their loyalty and
for the limits on possible generalization about their behaviour. But Locke
"on G overnm ent” w as also th e presentation of a cogitated case, a piece of
intellectual persuasion, from a mind with a great deal in common with that
of Hobbes, fully aw are of the ch an g e which H obbes had wrought.29
Laslett further o b serv es that the influence of Locke a s a political writer
arose, "probably b e ca u se of his philosophical fame"30 while H obbes, w hose goal
w as to write a political program, w as read and see n a s literature only.31
P angle estab lish es a similar Hobbes-Locke connection. He attributes to
H obbes a radically transform ed concept of the "state of nature" from a state of
innocence prior to the Fall (in the Bible) to a "state of warring". From this
transform ation H obbes developed his theory of natural rights, social compact,
and sovereignty. Locke's amelioration to H obbes's theory m ade it "something
accep tab le to the great body of decen t opinion--and som ething not only
accep tab le but overwhelming in its appeal".32
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Pangle continues on to explain Locke's refutation of Filmer's position in
Patriarcha by directing the re a d er to one of Filmer's le sse r writings,
O bservations on Mr. Hob's Leviathan. In so doing the issu e h a s becom e a
question of w hether Filmer's scriptural argum ents against th e H obbesian
conception of m an is valid or invalid. Locke p ro ceed s to answ er that Filmer's
argum ents are invalid, therefore, H obbes "State of Nature" doctrine stands.
Locke h a s affirmed H obbes's stand .33
Similarities betw een H obbes and Locke are se e n by David Held to
include:
Their view on the establishm ent of the political world a s p reced ed by the
existence of individuals endow ed with natural rights...their concern to
derive and explain the very possibility of governm ent... their concern
about w hat form legitimate governm ent should take and about the
conditions for security, p e a c e and freedom .34
W hile there is no docum ented evidence that Locke drew directly from
H obbes, the philosophy and argum ent in Two T reatises supports H obbes
influence. Locke's writings parallel H obbes's ideas on natural law and universal
equality, the concepts that T hom as Jefferson w as to establish a s th e moral
foundations for the United States.
This moral prerogative b a se d on H obbesian equity is critical to the
argum ent in support of FIJA. The individual will u se the sam e moral prerogative
of equity to determ ine the law a s a juror that “the public” (the artificial entity
representing private individuals) u sed w hen establishing the law. So, if the
people go so far a s to establish a governm ent b ased on the moral prerogative
that every individual h as the sam e rights to the sam e extent, then the artificial
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entity estab lish ed to adm inister th e legalities of the law can in no way have more
power than the individuals originating that entity w hen it com es to determining
the moral prerogatives upon which law is based . Mathie observes:
Equity becom es, in the teaching of H obbes, the b a sis of a new political
order fully realizable in any time and place and even invulnerable against
all internal c a u se s of dissolution, b e c a u se that order is founded on the
co n sen t of men who a re by n ature equal and allows men to p ursue a
com m odious existence through their own industry within a structure
recognizing that sam e equity.35
T he strength of the system lies in the ad h eren ce to the moral prerogative
by th e individual at all times. T he entire political order is at stak e w hen
individuals a re prohibited from acting according to their moral prerogatives at
any given time. Any attem pt by the state to limit or prohibit th e individuals right to
a d h ere to his or her moral prerogative such a s prohibiting jurors to act according
to co nscience puts the state at risk of dissolution-extrem e lan g u ag e but the
correct appraisal of what h ap p en s during th e transition from legitimate to non
legitimate governm ent.

41
ENDNOTES

1.

H.R. Rep. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Session. 8 (1968);1968 U.S. code
Cong. Ad. News 1797 a s cited in Scheflin and Van Dyke, "Jury
Nullification: T he C ontours of a Controversy", Law and
Contem porary Problem s. 43:4, 78-79

2.

Jeffrey Abramson, W e. the Jury: T he Jury System and the Ideal of
Democracy, (New York: B asic Books, a Division of
H arperCollinsPublishers, 1994), 58

3.

Ibid., 61

4.

Plato The Last Days of S o crates

5.

Ibid.

6.

Cicero, De Legibus a s cited in A braham Edel, Elizabeth Flower, Finbarr
W. O ’Connor, Morality. Philosophy and Practice: Historical and
C ontem porary R eading and S tu d ies, (New York: Random H ouse
Inc., 1989), 75

7.

Edward S. Corwin, “T h e’Higher Law’ Backgound of American
Consitutional Law”, Harvard Law Review. 42:2 (1928), 157

8.

Ibid., 71

9.

Craig W alton, "H obbes on the Natural and the Artificial", C. W alton and P.
J. Johnson, ed. H o b b es's *S cience of Natural Ju stic e ', (Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 80

10.

Ibid., 78

11.

Ibid.

12.

H obbes, De Cive a s cited in William Mathie, "Commentary on Professor
M ay's 'H o b b es on Equity and Justice', C. W alton and P.J.
Johnson, ed. H obbes's 'S cien ce of Natural Ju stic e ', (Boston:
M artinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 255

13.

William Mathie, "Justice and Equity: An Inquiry Into T he M eaning and
Role of Equity in the H obbesian Account of Ju stice and Politics"
C. W alton and P.J. Johnson, ed. H obbes's 'S c ie n c e of Natural
Ju stice’, (Boston: M artinue Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 274

Penguin C lassics, 68

42

14.

Aristotle, The N icom achean Ethics. The W orld's C lassics, 133

15.

Mathie,

16.

Ibid., 270

17.

Thom as H obbes, Leviathan, 116, a s cited in Mathie, 272

268

18.

W alton, 85

19.

Mathie, 274

20.

"The Constitution of the United States", a s cited in Edward C onrad Smith
and Harold J. S paeth ed. The Constitution of the United States.
(New York: B arnes and Noble Books, 1987), 41

21.

Patrick Henry, "S p eech es of Patrick Henry (June 5 and 7, 1788)", Ralph
Ketcham, ed. T he A nti-Federalist P ap ers and th e Constitutional
Convention D eb ates. (New York: Mentor Book, 1986), 202

22.

A lexander Hamilton, "No. 83: Hamilton", A lexander Hamilton, Jam e s
M adison, John Jay, The F ederalist P a p e rs. (New York: NAL
Penguin Inc., 1 9 6 1 )4 9 9

23.

Ibid.

24.

T hom as H obbes. Leviathan. Collier Books, 104

25.

Ibid., 103-104

26.

"Declaration of Independence", Edward C onrad Smith an d Harold J.
S paeth ed. The Constitution of the United S ta te s . (New York:
B arnes and Noble Books, 1987), 26

27.

Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in Am erica, (New York,
Brace, and Company, 1955), 6

28.

J a m e s H. Rutherford, T he Moral Foundations of United S tates
Constitutional D em ocracy. (Pittsburgh, D orrance Publishing Co.,
Inc., 1992), 33

29.

P e te r Laslett, ‘Introduction ' to John Locke, Two T reatises of
G overnm ent. C am bridge Texts in the History of Political Thought,
P e te r Laslett ed. (C am bridge University P ress, 1988), 92

30.

Ibid., 90

Harcourt,

43

31.

Ibid., 91

32.

Thom as L. Pangle, T he Spirit of Modern R epublicanism . (Chicago: The
University of Chicago P ress, 1988), 131

33.

Ibid., 140

34.

David Held, Political Theory and th e Modern S ta te , (Stanford, Stanford
University P ress, 1989), 1989

35.

Mathie, 274

44

CHAPTER FOUR
POLITICS OF THE JURY
NULLIFICATION
INSTRUCTION

The focus of the previous chapter w as the ethical foundation for
establishing and maintaining law in a free society. It w as determ ined that: 1.)
citizens implement natural law in their community according to th e moral
prerogatives dictated by equity; 2.) citizens must constantly check on the moral
authority of the law making sure that the artificial entities (the state and its
institutions) designated to adm inister the law capture th e e s s e n c e of the natural
law in the written law; historically trial by jury is o ne m ean s by which this check
can be made; 3.) this check is essen tial to the perpetuation of the free society;
and 4.) it is unethical for any person to prevent or c a u s e to prevent citizens from
exercising their right to check the moral authority of th e law. Therefore, it is an
unethical practice fo rju d g es and/or the judicial system to prevent the jury
nullification instruction or the u se of the concept of jury nullification a s a d efense.
The focus of this chapter will b e the general policy of the courts not to
inform jurors of their right to determ ine the law and th e political significance of
this policy to the political order established by th e Constitution. The proposed
corrective m easure of a "Fully Informed Jury Amendment" (Act) will be exam ined
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to determ ine if it is a viable solution.

Jury Nullification
While it is possible in a republican form of governm ent to have som e
influence in the general lawmaking p ro cess through the election of
representatives and the initiative and referendum process, it is only through jury
deliberation that twelve representatives of the community a s a whole have a
ch an ce to a ssem b le and make a final, binding statem ent a s to what the
community considers lawful in specific circum stances. The power to ch o se not
to enforce a law against som eone is referred to a s the power of ‘jury
nullification'. It occurs w hen the jury determ ines that a law d o es not apply to the
c a s e being tried b e c a u se of particular circum stances unique to that c a s e and
finds a 'n o t guilty1verdict for the defendant. The jury h as in effect checked the
sta te 's application of the law to the c a s e and h a s determ ined that application to
be inconsistent with the conscience of the community, even though th e facts may
be consistent with the artificial law. Jeffrey Abramson, a professor of politics at
B randeis University, describes jury nullification in his book, W e. the Jury, in the
following m anner:
Jury nullification is about the right to set a sid e the law only to acquit,
never to convict. As a doctrine, jury nullification p o ses no threat to the
accused; it is in fact the tim e-honored way of permitting juries to leaven
the law with leniency.1
The second chapter of this thesis recounted historical u se of jury
nullification through the 1970's and the political trials of the Vietnam W ar protest
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movement. A bram son cites m ore recen t c a s e s w here h e believes jury
nullification offers the best possible explanation for the verdict.
The 1994 acquittal of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, a cc u sed of violating a Michigan
law that m ade it illegal to a ssist p erso n s to commit suicide, is th e first exam ple
offered. T he law under which he w as prosecuted contained an exemption for the
acts that w ere done with the intent of relieving pain and suffering ev en if the
person performing the acts knew they would hasten death. In post-trial
interviews jurors indicated a belief that Dr. Kevorkian acted only to relieve the
p e rso n 's pain and suffering even though h e continued th e action of holding the
m ask and releasing the carbon monoxide into the patient's (victim's) lungs for
twenty m inutes. A bram son's explanation of the jury's behavior in the Kevorkian
acquittal is that "they nullified the law insofar a s it prohibited a physician from
assisting a suicide."2
Next A bram son illustrates jury nullification at work in the 1990 jury
acquittal and deadlock of W ashington D.C. mayor, Marion Barry. In spite of
overwhelming evidence in eleven of the thirteen charges--som e of which w as
acquired through an FBI sting operation-- the jury acted with relative leniency
acquitting or deadlocking on twelve of the thirteen charges, convicting on one
minor charge in order not to sen d the "wrong m essage" about drugs.3
Analyzing the verdicts W ashington columnist William R aspberry
speculated that:
The jury behaved a s if W ashington w ere a 'fed eral colony1with a
black population and a white power structure. T he jury, R aspberry
thought, bridled at the year-long vendetta of the U.S. Attorney's Office
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and the FBI to bring down a popular black mayor. They refused to
convict, beyond that o n e charge, out of a s e n s e that "occupying forces"
had pulled out all the sto p s to topple a powerful black m an for merely
personal sins.4 T h ere may have b een no legal b asis for som e jurors'
refusal to convict on th e m ost serious ch arg es, but R aspberry
congratulated them for using their nullifying pow ers to sen d a powerful
m e ssa g e to federal authorities about the nature of life in W ashington
D.C.5
T he last c a s e A bram son u s e s to illustrate jury nullification is the Irancontra trial of Olive North. Clearly instructed by th e judge that following orders
did not ex cu se criminal acts the jury pro ceed ed to acquit North on nine of the
twelve charges, on the grounds that h e argued his superiors knew of his false
statem en ts to C ongress and his other step s to cover up illegal Contra-funding
activity. T he jury did convict him of the three c h arg es w here the evidence
indicated that North acted alone, without authorization from superiors. Post-trial
com m ents by jurors indicate they:
Believed North w as a ‘sc a p e g o a t blam ed unfairly for following the
instructions of his superiors and that is why [we] voted to acquit'6 him of
the ch arg es of lying’
A bram son concludes:
The jurors' words, a s well a s th e verdict pattern, su g g est that they
decided, against the judge's instructions, that it would b e unjust to convict
som eone for carrying out governm ent policies approved at the very top,
even if North had to lie to C o n g ress to carry on.8
In e ac h of th e se c a s e s the jury found unique a sp e c ts that prevented them
from applying the law under which the defen d an ts w ere prosecuted. T he written
law did not change, it simply w as determ ined through jury deliberation that the
law w as not applicable in the situation, so the jury nullified the law in each case.
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T he C ontroversy

While jury nullification is not specifically outlawed in any state, only four
state constitutions (Maryland, Indiana, O regon and Georgia) have provided for
judges to instruct jurors sitting on criminal juries of their right to determ ine the
law a s well a s the facts.9 In Indiana a trial judge may:
D eclare the law to the jury but... [it] m ust not b e done in a m anner
calculated to bind the conscience of jurors and restrict them in their right
to determ ine the law for th em selv es.10
And in Maryland a judge instructs:
M em bers of the Jury, this is a criminal c a s e and under the constitution
and laws of th e state of Maryland in a criminal c a s e the jury a re the
judges of the law a s well a s of the facts in the case. So that w hatever I
tell you about the law while it is intended to b e helpful to you in reaching a
just and proper verdict in the c ase , it is not binding upon you a s m em bers
of the jury and you may accept it or reject it. And you may apply th e law
a s you a p p reh en d it to be in th e c a s e .11
Currently tw enty-three s ta te s 12 include jury nullification provisions in their
constitutions under their sections on freedom of sp eech , especially with resp ect
to libel and sedition c a s e s .13 However, since no instruction by the judge
informing jurors of this right is required, th e jurors who are often unfamiliar with
the details of their sta te constitutions a re unaw are that they have the pow er to
exercise this right.
The power of jury nullification exists today only for th o se jurors ed u cated
about their right to nullify law and confident enough to follow through with nonrestrictive deliberations. Uninformed jurors a re led to believe that their
deliberations m ust be restricted to coincide with th e instructions given by the
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judge, disregarding their own conscience and s e n s e of justice. In doing so th e
jury becom es nothing more than a fact-finding body.
The jury is led to believe they are a fact-finding body only through the
rhetoric of jurors' handbooks and courtroom instructions. Exemplified locally, the
handbook of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the S tate of N evada, "Jurors'
Handbook: Jury Service....An American Heritage, A Personal Privilege",
requires jurors to sw ear or affirm to the following oath:
You and e ac h of you do solemnly sw ear (or affirm) that you will
well and truly try the c a se now pending before this Court and a true
verdict render, so help you G od?14
This oath is non-restrictive, in that it d o e s not bind the juror to abide by
the Court's instructions a s to the law or for that m atter upon th e evidence
received into the record by the Court. However, the very next parag rap h in the
jurors' handbook adm onishes the jurors to restrict their deliberations to just that:

This oath is not to be taken lightly or soon forgotten. By
taking your oath you have given your word that you will reach your
verdict solely upon evidence received into the record by the Court
and permitted to remain, and upon th e Court's instructions a s to
the law. You m ust not consider any other evidence. You m ust not
consider any other instructions. As a juror, your position will b e a s
important a s that of the judge in the administration of justice in the
c a s e at h and.15
After a discussion on trial procedures the "Jurors' Handbook" once again
em phasizes the restrictions placed on jury deliberations by the ju d g e's
instructions rather than the jurors' oath:
At the conclusion of the testimony, th e next step, and a m ost
important one, is taken by the judge. T he judge will instruct you on
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the law that applies to the case, and you must apply that law to the
facts a s you find them in arriving at your verdict.16
T he dilemma of the juror in deciding if he or sh e is to ab id e by his oath or
obey the judge's instructions is ex acerb ated a s this handbook revisits the great
tradition of jury ju stic e-b ein g representative of the community's s ta n d a rd s -a
tradition that included the right to nullify law.
T he verdict resulting from your deliberations will not only determ ine
the outcom e of the particular c ase , but it will also influence the
general caliber of justice ren d ered in our community. Ju ries in this
court have b een doing meritorious service. They have se t a worthy
standard. It is the responsibility of our judges, of you, and of all
future jurors to insure th e continuance of jury service at th at high
level.17
This dilemma is not unique to the Eighth Judicial District Court of th e State of
N evada. A bram son finds this sam e type of instruction in virtually every
jurisdiction's handbook in the country.18
T he devastation c au se d by jurors lacking the nullification instruction can
be felt by the d efendants a s evidenced by convictions rather than hung juries
open to retrial; a s well a s the jurors w h o se integrity is com prom ised a s they are
forced to apply the law reg ard less of their own s e n s e of justice and good
conscience.
In 1980 Scheflin and Van Dyke published "Jury Nullification: The
Contours of a Controversy"19, in which they explored the five major argum ents
against giving the nullification instruction to the jury. The five positions
rep resen ted by th e se argum ents have b een labeled by Scheflin and Van Dyke
as: 1.) the "anti-anarchy" position; 2.) th e "nullification-is-unnecessary" position;
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3.) the "nullification-is-unwise" position; 4.) the "dam n-good-reason" position;
and 5.) the "responsibility-of-the-juror" position. "Contours of a Controversy"
w as written in the 1980’s; however, proponents for not giving the nullification
instruction still propose th e se sam e argum ents today.
The supporters of the "anti-anarchy" position fear jury sovereignty would
lead to anarchy and law lessness. This fear illustrates a lack of understanding of
the dispensing power of the ju ry -th e power to "suspend th e application of a
particular law in a particular instance to a particular defendant in th e interest of
co nscience and justice".20 The jury's deliberations a re limited to the particular
c a s e at hand and no legal preced en ts are set. However, su p p o se th ere w ere a
string of such c a se s: nullification of the sam e law under many different
circum stances should indicate to legislators that th e law is not representative of
th e conscience of th e community.
The "nullification is unnecessary" position is supported by th o se who
believe nullification serv es no useful function in our legal system b e c a u se other
a v e n u e s are available for resolution of situations often decided through jury
nullification. Scheflin and Van Dyke describe th e se situations a s o n e s "where
the exercise of co nscience by the jury is particularly important to protect th e
defendant and to e n su re the fairness of the legal system ".21 Such situations
might be a prosecution brought on by an overzealous prosecutor bringing
prosecution b e c a u se a prom inent or controversial person is involved or b e c a u se
of som e personal relationship betw een the prosecutor and one of the parties, or
p erh ap s a situation in which the trial judge is not able to view the c a se

objectively, yet d o e s not recu se himself. C a s e s with unique circum stances such
a s the governm ent being the victim of th e crime in a way that m akes it
impossible for the prosecutor not to p ro secu te or for the judge to dism iss the
m atter (C am den 28 Jury); or a c a s e so highly publicized that prosecution is
unavoidable, though undesirable, which could m ore easily resolve itself through
jury nullification than other channels but th e argum ent is that c a s e s such a s
th e se can be handled by req u ests for dism issal or mistrial. Jury nullification,
acquitting a defendant, in c a s e s w here th e governm ent h a s ov erstep p ed
legitimate bounds in its efforts to bring th e defendant to trial (Ruby Ridge and
W aco com e to mind) would be appropriate if req u ests for dism issal w ere
ignored. Hamilton identifies this exact scenario in reference to rev en u e a g en ts
and comments:
And a s to the conduct of th e officers of the revenue, the provision
in favor of trial by jury in criminal c a s e s will afford the security aim ed at.
Willful a b u s e s of a public authority, to the oppression of th e s u b je c t, and
every sp e c ie s of official extortion, a re offenses ag ain st the governm ent for
which the p erso n s who commit them may be indicted and punished
according to the circum stances of th e c a s e .22
Finally, the situations presented w hen th e defen d an t h as the sym pathy of the
community b e c a u s e of his sufferings or o n e who h a s violated an unpopular law
and the community d o e s not condem n his actions are conducive to resolution
through jury nullification. In each of th e se exam ples alternative ch an n els for
resolution may exist but a s Scheflin and Van Dyke point out "the jury is th e only
institution sufficiently free of technical legal constraints to reach a just and
reaso n ed conclusion."23
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The "nullification-is-unwise" position holds that nullification is inconsistent
with dem ocracy since it "allows a single juror the opportunity to overthrow the
majority will a s ex p ressed in legislative enactm ents."24 S upporters of this
position believe unjust laws a re never en acted. They fail to understand the
strength of the m e ssa g e frequent nullification of a law se n d s to legislators--"laws
frequently nullified are probably not reflective of th e p eo p le's will and the jurors,
a s representatives of the people, are saying so".25
T he "dam n-good-reason" position originally p resen ted by Kadish and
Kadish in Discretion to D isobey acknow ledges the jury's power to nullify is
legitimized only by a "dam n-good-reason" defined a s th e attainm ent of the end
for which the jury is committed to serv e-ju stice. Recognizing the value of the
nullification pow er to the legal system , Kadish and Kadish a rg u e that juries
should not be told of their pow er to nullify ensuring u se in extrem e c a s e s only,
and limiting the u se of this power overall.
Scheflin's and Van Dyke's opposition to the "dam n-good-reason" position
is four pronged. First, th ere is no empirical evidence to support th e claim that if
told of their right jurors would wield their power indiscriminately. Second, the
"dam n-good-reason" position relies on deception. T here a re no political
ad v an ta g e s to be gained through a legal system b a se d on deception. Third, this
position is internally inconsistent. T he proponents of th e "dam n-good-reason"
position w ant jurors to be informed of their right and power (and even u se them
on occasion) but they do not w ant the courts to b e th e medium by which they are
informed of their right and power. Finally, nullification instructions would lead to
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more just verdicts b e c a u se the nullification instruction would establish stan d ard s
on which to b a se a verdict. T h e se stan d ard s would be justice and good
conscience rather than the b ia se s of each juror.
The final argum ent ag ain st giving th e nullification instruction is the
"responsibility-of-the-juror" position; this position h a s ad v o cates coming from two
very different perspectives.
Professor G eorge Christie ad v o cates not giving the nullification
instruction to the jury out of fear that the application of the law in question would
be outw eighed by the application of a law which required jurors to acquit on the
grounds of good conscience. His fear is that jurors would perceive the
nullification instruction a s an imperative rather than a prerogative. He states:
T he nullification instruction would be perceived by jurors a s a com m and
that they m ust acquit 'if they feel strongly enough about the m atter'.26
Scheflin and Van Dyke explain Christie's objection to the perceived imperative in
that it rem oves the responsibility for acquitting from the jurors to the law
recognizing the right of nullification.
This is the b asis of objection b e ca u se h e believes that the jurors alone
b e ar responsibility for acquitting in th e se circum stances not the law which
permits them to get aw ay with doing so .27
Ju d g e Leventhal arrives at the sam e conclusion that nullification
instructions should not be given to jurors. His reasoning is that the burden of
taking responsibility for condem nation may overpow er the jurors if they know
they also have the power to free the defendant. Leventhal s e e s the nullification
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instruction a s a m ean s of personalizing jury deliberations rather than keeping
the deliberations in the legal arena.
Scheflin and Van Dyke counter-argue ag ain st this position with the
obvious. They state:
Jury service is a heavy responsibility and any attem pt to m ake it
lighter by passing responsibility to an o th er governm ental agency or
institution violates the concept of th e jury. Jury service should be
understood and treated a s one of the m ost solem n and meaningful
obligations a citizen can be called upon to perform.28
They conclude:
W e do not believe that it is conducive to good citizenship or good
character to shift the responsibility elsew h ere rather than standing up for
what you believe is right. If jurors have reach ed unpopular verdicts which
they feel a re nevertheless correct, and if they feel that they hav e the
obligation to explain those verdicts, then their explanations should be
b a se d upon their recognition of their own role in attempting to do justice
within the law.29

Political Significance of Not Giving
a Nullification Instruction
Scheflin's and Van Dyke's counter argum ents to the five opposing
positions stem from their belief that "failure to inform the jury of their right to
nullify seriously w eakens the ‘concept of jury', thereby impermissibly diluting the
defendant's Sixth Am endm ent rights".30 Jury nullification a s a right is an
enhancem ent of our judicial and political system .
The right of the jury to nullify applications of the law in a particular
c a s e can also be supported on political grounds a s an essen tial a sp e c t of
dem ocratic self-governm ent. It serv es to remind governm ents and legal
professionals that the people are sovereign. It serv es to remind the
community that protection of its liberty and freedom rests in the h an d s of
the people.31
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A bram son d iscu sses the political restructuring that occurs a s a result of
the loss of the nullification right. W eak, fact-finding-only juries resulting from the
lack of the nullification instruction a re a m ean s by which liberty and selfgovernm ent a re redefined, skewing the justice system into an institution foreign
to the Constitution upon which our political order w as established.
In the chapter, "Juries and Higher Justice", A bramson parallels the
decline of th e nullification instruction to "basic shifts in th e nature of American
law and dem ocracy".32
R egarding the nature of law, A bram son identifies two fundam ental shifts
requiring w eaker juries. The first shift w as from law "having its source in natural
reason"33 to the complex law rooted in "the shifting politics of a legislature, not
necessarily rational, and certainly not traceab le to eternal laws of nature".34 To
quote Abramson:
This basic, overwhelming ch an g e in our views about the nature of law
h a s carried with it fundam ental c h a n g e s in the nature of the jury. From an
institution that once presum ed ordinary citizens w ere com petent to make
independent judgem ents about th e law, the jury ch an g ed to reflect the
assum ption that jurors knew precious little about the law. From an
institution that valued decentralized justice and local control over law’s
interpretation, the jury b ecam e exclusively a fact-finding body, leaving
judges to enforce a more uniform and consistent body of legal rules.
T h ese c h a n g e s w ere so m onum ental that it is scarcely an exaggeration to
say that the jury praised by A m erica's founders no longer survives
today.35
T he seco n d “shift” Abramson d isc u sse s is the law’s relation to the
community a s a result of the growth of heterogeneity and changing concepts of
dem ocracy. He draw s from a study by William Nelson36 indicating that the
growth of heterogeneity changed the function of the legal system , making it less
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an em bodim ent of sh ared values and natural justice and m ore of a profession
designed to referee the com prom ises and protect the d u e p ro c e ss of competing
interest groups.37 This is evidenced in th e redefining of the impartial jury (to be
discu ssed in more detail later in this chapter) to one that is representational of
minority dem ographics in the communities, and cross-sectional in that the jury
must now rep resen t the b ia se s within the community.
T he changing concept of dem ocracy that A bramson d escrib es is the
geographical shift of the lawmaking p ro cess from the decentralized local level to
the centralized national level. This shift occurred with th e transfer of power that
com es with deciding the law at the local level, at the h an d s of th e citizens, via
the trial by jury process, to the h an d s of the ju d g es at the national level. As the
law developed into a complex legal system federal judges com plained "that
juries gave local communities too much control over the law".38 Their argum ent
w as that:
In a Republican form of governm ent, law could not rule u n less its
application w as uniform. Juries, arm ed with the right to decide questions
of law, threaten ed th e se core legal values by giving too volatile an
expression to popular sovereignty.39
According to Abramson, in order to retain the control of the lawmaking
power in the central governm ent federal ju d g es changed th e political theory of
self-governm ent b a se d on natural law (and em bodied in trial by jury) to selfgovernm ent b a se d on artificial law (em bodied in due process). In effect this
theory:
S evered the classical connection betw een liberty and self-governm ent. In
this new theory, too much popular participation in the judiciary w as a
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decided threat to freedom . Liberty w as a m atter of receiving equal
protection from the law, not necessarily a m atter of making the law in
itself.40
T he conclusion to this line of reasoning is that judges, not juries, are b e st suited
to determ ine the law.
Abram son continues, turning his discussion to th e two inconsistencies
that em erge when juries are limited to fact finding only. The first inconsistency is
that this division of labor, fact finding v ersu s determ ining the law, d o e s not hold
up well in practice. It s e e m s that in spite of judicial instruction on th e law jurors
default to their own common s e n s e and co n scien ce during deliberations for
num erous re a so n s including the lack of understanding of the ju d g es instructions
on the law and the frustration they encounter w hen the judge fails to clarify the
instructions upon req u est.41
Secondly, the questions of the courtroom do not sep a ra te nicely into
law/fact distinctions. A bram son d iscu sses how determ ining fact often
e n c o m p a sse s complex decisions b ased on the nature and d eg ree of the
d efendant's behavior in relation to community stan d ard s. He cites exam ples of
jurors being asked to decide if defendants a re guilty of malice, obscenities,
negligence or even murder. In e ac h c a s e the ju ry - a s a m atter of so called factfinding-m ust "in fact" determ ine the moral stan d a rd s of the community, which is,
in effect determining law !42
A bramson also recognizes the potential which nullification h a s "for jurors
to u n leash their prejudices in the nam e of conscience".43 Citing a s exam ples
"the all white southern juries failing to convict w hites charged with murdering
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blacks or civil rights w orkers of any race"44 during th e 1960's, even though the
verdicts "flew in the face of evidence and law".45 As late a s 1979 jury
nullification w as the basis of not guilty verdicts for KKK Klansmen a cc u sed of
gunning down m archers in an anti-Klan rally in G reensboro, North Carolina.
Again in 1984 th e se sam e d efen d an ts w ere acquitted in federal court on c h arg es
of violating federal civil rights laws.46
T he G reensboro exam ple of jury nullification is devastating at face value
b e c a u s e it illuminates the d a n g ers of unchecked local b ia se s upon minority
groups. T he G reensboro c a s e reeked of racism making it incapable of nullifying
law b e c a u s e a morally unjust jury (one that is not lawful or congruent with natural
la w -b ia se d ) could not determ ine the moral stan d ard s of the community.
G reensboro and similar c a s e s exemplify th e results that occur w hen juries stray
from the stan d ard of justice establish ed through H obbesian equity (do unto
others a s you would have done unto you).
T he civil rights m ovem ent of th e 1960's, which th e G reensboro c a s e w as
part of, h a s forced judicial review of jury selection p ro ced u res in order to e n su re
due p rocess. No longer are local b ia se s allowed to influence jury selection, thus
eliminating discriminatory juries such a s the o n es responsible for the
G reensboro acquittal. As A bram son points out "juries selected through prejudice
deliberated through prejudice".47
T he Suprem e Court h a s moved to rectify th e jury selection process in
order to prevent the discriminatory juries prevalent in th e South betw een 1935
and 1975. As a result the nature of an impartial jury h a s ch an g ed from being a

60
deliberative body to one that b a lan c e s the b iases of jurors. This new jury is
described by Abram son as:
o n e that basically fits the pluralist paradigm of dem ocracy and interest
group politics...the key to jury verdicts becom es whom the jurors are, not
w hat the evidence show s...and the highest aspiration we can have for the
jury dem ocracy is to rep resen t th e perspectives of groups in som e fair
way, to b alan ce the b ia se s of jurors and therefore achieve an overall
impartial jury.48
While the courts can provide rem edies w hen the trial by jury p ro cess repeatedly
fails to d isp en se justice, it cannot, however, furnish th e morality n e ce ssa ry to
promote justice w here none exists; for morality is the originator of law and
subsequently justice.
R ecognizing the inherent benefits an d d an g ers em bodied in the power of
the nullification right, A bramson concludes that "this is a risk w e m ust take to
p reserve th e jury a s a forum w here ordinary p erso n s gain th e pow er to reconcile
law and justice in concrete c a se s".49 To do anything le ss than acknow ledge the
right to jury nullification would "threaten the integrity of th e law"50, and "open the
chasm betw een law and the popular beliefs that the jury system exists to
prevent".51 T he risk of fully informing jurors of their right to nullify m ust be taken if
the political o rd e r-b a s e d on law not le g a litie s-a s originally estab lish ed in this
country is to be restored.

Fully Informed Jury Amendment,
A Rem edy
T he Fully Informed Jury A ssociation (FIJA) w as founded in the sum m er of
1989 a s a lobbying interest advocating laws to protect th e right of jury
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nullification. M embership in FIJA cuts a cro ss political lines and rep resen ts
citizens from all walks of life interested in preserving the trial by jury tradition
handed down from our forefathers. The common ground th e se people sh are is
their connection to, support for or recognition of the power of civil disobedience.
Tax protesters, antilogging environm entalists, advocates for the legalization of
marijuana, bikers opposed to m andatory helm et laws, th o se op p o sed to gun
control laws (National Rifle Association), and most recently supporters of citizen
militias, along with others who recognize the source of potential governm ent
oppression, all turn to the power of jury nullification "as a way of authorizing the
jury to determ ine w hether the disobeyed laws ought to b e enforced".52
T he organization w as founded after attem pts to u se a jury nullification
d efen se by ‘O peration R escue' anti-abortion protesters w as foiled by the
presiding judges. Jam e s Holman, one of the defendants and publisher and
editor of the "The S an Diego R eader" new spaper, placed an ad in that
new spaper that explained the traditional right of jury nullification and urged the
jurors to act according to their co nscien ce while deliberating the case. The
judges in re sp o n se to the ad instructed th e jurors that their duty required them to
apply the law w hether they agreed with it or not. The ad w arned the jurors that
the judges would indeed take this position and informed them that this instruction
by the ju d g es w as both unjust and illegal b e c a u se the jurors had a historic right
to disregard the law to uphold a higher justice. The question of tre sp a ss w as not
the only issu e the protesters w anted to a d d re ss though their trial. They w anted
to ad d re ss the underlying issue of the morality of abortion by claiming the
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immorality of abortion more than justified the tre sp ass. Confused and ill
informed about their rights the jurors convicted the defendants53. W hile the
attem pt to u se jury nullification a s a d efen se failed the protesters, the publicity of
this little known rig h t-g en e ra te d through this trial-revived interest in the concept
of jury nullification.
FIJA's goal is to have state constitutions am ended or other legislation
adopted to require that judges include in their instructions to the jurors the
know ledge that they, the jurors, have the right to determ ine the law a s well a s
the facts in their deliberations.
Eighteen s ta te s54 have had or will have FIJA bills introduced in their
1995/96 legislative se ssio n s.55 The Fully Informed Jury Association provides
lobbyists exam ples of appropriate wording for "Fully Informed Jury" legislation.
O ne such exam ple reads:
W henever governm ent is one of the parties in a trial by jury, the
court shall inform the jurors that each of them h a s an inherent right to vote
on the verdict, in the direction of mercy, according to his own conscience
and s e n s e of justice. Exercise of this right may include jury consideration
of the defendant's motives and circum stances, d eg ree of harm done, and
evaluation of the law itself. Failure to so inform the jury is grounds for
mistrial and another trial by jury.56 (S ee Appendix)
Scheflin, Van Dyke and Abramson p resen t good evidence to support
their positions that the c o n se q u e n ce s of not fully informing jurors of their right to
determ ine both law and fact a re both societal and political-m eaning that they
affect th e m anner by which society influences th e political p ro cesses. Scheflin's
and Van Dyke's argum ents illustrate that not giving the nullification instruction to
the jurors seriously d am ag es the historical concept of jury upon which our
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judicial system o p erates and jeopard izes the protection provided to the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. A bram son's argum ent pointedly traces the
erosion of law and justice in our com munities to the creation of juries em pow ered
for fact-finding only, juries limited by the judges instruction to decide the facts
b a se d on the evidence only. The resulting judicial system is no longer cen tered
in the co nscience of the community but in policy m anuals rem oved from the
reach of ordinary citizens. In e ac h c a s e the individuals who once acted a s a
moral check on the authority of the written law w ere rem oved from the process.
Is it possible to restore the system of law and justice created by our
forefathers and held in such high e ste e m through th e y e a rs? I believe such
restoration is possible and that a Fully Informed Jury A m endm ent is a step in the
right direction.
FIJA legislation would definitely restore the historical concept of trial by
jury in the country. Requiring the courts to charge the jury with the duty of
determ ining the law and the fact in acco rd an ce with a s e n s e of conscience and
justice rein states the type of deliberations that w ere at o ne time customary.
Such an am endm ent would elim inate for jurors, already know ledgeable about
their right to deliberate without limits, the dilemma p resen ted w hen the court
limits jury deliberations to fact- finding only.
FIJA legislation would a d d re ss Scheflin's and Van Dyke's concern about
protecting a defendant's Sixth A m endm ent rights to an impartial jury by requiring
that the courts enforce due p ro c e ss by informing jurors of their right to vote
according to their conscience and s e n s e of justice and not merely act a s a
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rubber stam p for th e judge. U nless a jury is ab le to deliberate about th e law and
its application it cannot be identified a s an impartial jury. To leave th e decisions
about the law and its application to the adm inistrators of the courts com prom ises
the system of justice which trial by jury is su p p o se d to provide-nam ely, a system
of justice in which the originators of the law a re also the enforcers of law.
FIJA legislation is consistent with both 'law fulness' and 'legalism', the
natural and artificial a sp e c ts of our judicial system . ‘Legalists’ th o se who
advocate adhering to artificial law, m ust ad v o cate the nullification instruction if
du e process, the result of legalism, is to b e provided. Nullification is th e pow er
by which juries retain their impartiality. Provided for in the Constitution an
impartial jury is a requirem ent that m ust b e ren d ered so a s not to violate the
written law. ‘Lawyers', th o se favoring law determ ined at the local level, m ust
advocate the instruction for jury nullification for it is the prem ise upon which law
b a se d on the con scien ce of the community is founded. Both ‘legalists’ and
'law yers' realize it is the people who originate th e law that must give their final
approval that this is in fact the situation in which the law in question applies.
FIJA legislation would e n su re that all citizens serving a s jurors would
have a common reference point from which to start their deliberations--that point
being the ethical foundation of the estab lish ed law in their community. The
transition of justice b a se d on law to justice b a se d on due pro cess a s described
by Abram son would be reversed over time. As jury nullification rights are
restored, citizens would again be responsible for establishing and maintaining
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law in their com m unities--the original prem ise upon which law in our
communities is founded.
FIJA legislation d o es not exist without restrictions, however. As
im plem ented in Indiana the following restrictions apply. "The jury's prerogative
lies with questions of the application of the law. The question of the law's
constitutionality resid es with the courts."57 T he Indiana S uprem e Court has
rejected the jury's power to c reate new crim es although no jury h a s ever
attem pted to do so. Juries cannot find a defendant guilty of a crime not charged;
however, they may find a defendant guilty of a lesser crime th an ch arg ed if all
the elem ents of that lesser offense a re p resen t in the g reater charge. Trial
judges in Indiana cannot m andate a verdict through instructions to jurors (i.e.
that the p re se n c e of certain evidence m an d ates a guilty v e rd ic t).58
As of the writing of Scheflin's and Van D ykes's article th ere h a s b een no
evidence in th e Indiana courts indicating th at judges th ere a re dissatisfied with
giving the nullification instruction. At that time there w as also no evidence
indicating juries w ere acquitting m ore often d u e to the instruction.59
In 1975 Maryland circuit ju d g es w ere surveyed by Prof. Gary Jaco b so h n
to determ ine their views on the Maryland nullification instruction. Out of the 81
justices surveyed 44 responded. T he majority of th e se 44 stated that the
nullification instruction had "not b e en a significant factor in shaping th e output of
the trial process".60 Other re sp o n se s included th ree claiming th e instruction
frequently affected th e outcome, and an o th er eight who determ ined the outcom e
w as only occasionally affected by the instruction.61

66
Overall only eight of the 44 judges responding to the survey felt
negatively about the nullification instruction. The others responded in a fashion
that lead Jacobsohn to believe that they thought the instruction should be
retained.
Asked specifically about the jury nullification instruction fourteen of the
respondents valued it b e c a u se it gave them insight into the "conscience of the
community". The twenty-two who disapproved of this jury power did so b e c a u se
they felt it infringed on the judicial domain rather than usurping power from the
legislative domain.62
W hether pronounced a s a right a s it is in Indiana, Maryland and several
other states, or operating incognito through th e g u ise of ed u cated jurors, jury
nullification is alive and well. In light of the ethical and political argum ents in
favor of jury nullification p resen ted in this ch ap ter I believe FIJA legislation ought
to be incorporated into our justice system legally recognizing a part of our
unique American heritage that provides the citizens an opportunity to act a s
moral ag en ts checking the activity of the governm ent upon its citizens.
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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this p ap er the trial by jury p ro cess h as b een shown to hold a critical
position in the political a re n a a s th e institution guaranteeing th e moral authority
of the law and therefore the final check on any activity of the governm ent against
its citizens. T he jury's right to determ ine the applicability of law a s well a s the
facts is w hat em pow ers the jury to act a s the moral check on governm ent activity.
This pow er to determ ine that th e law d o e s not apply in any given c a s e is known
a s "jury nullification". It h a s b een proven historically (C hapter 2) and
contem porary (C hapter 4) that this pow er of nullification d o e s work a s a moral
check on governm ent activity keeping it in line with w hat th e conscience of the
community determ ines to be lawful.
C hapter three established individual citizens acting in community a s the
originators of th e law and a s such th e only moral authority cap ab le of
determ ining equity and dispensing justice. This is estab lish ed through the u se
of H obbes' definition of the co n cep ts “equity” and “justice” a s applied to the dual
role of the trial by jury process. Disallowing jurors know ledge of their right to
exercise their pow er of jury nullification is shown to b e an inequitable and
therefore an unethical practice.
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C hapter four explains how the integrity of our judicial system is
com prom ised w hen citizens are not fully informed of their power a s jurors to
nullify law. The transition from the theory of justice established by our founding
fathers to the theory of justice practiced today is paralleled with the decline of
jury rights leading to the conclusion that jurors m ust be informed of their power
to nullify if we a s citizens are to maintain our positions a s originator of th e law
and moral a g en ts in the political process. T he controversial issu e is w hether the
courts should be required to inform jurors of their power through a Fully Informed
Jury A m endm ent or if jurors are to acquire this information from other sources.
This last chapter will state my conclusions, provide a recom m endation on
how to achieve the goal set forth in the conclusion along with a rationale for the
recom m endation.

C onclusions

It is the position of this thesis that Fully Informed Jury legislation should
b e en acted for the following reasons:
1. A Fully Informed Jury A m endm ent would restore the lawmaking
process, d esigned to check the governm ent's power, to th e h an d s of its
(the governm ent's) moral agents, the people.
2. A Fully Informed Jury A m endm ent would acknow ledge a s a right
a power already held by jurors and u sed in many c a s e s maintaining
integrity within our system of justice.
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3. A Fully Informed Jury A mendment would enforce a jury process
a s gu aran teed in Article III of the Constitution and th e Sixth, Seventh and
Fourteenth Am endm ents. Q uoted respectively:
The trial of all crimes, except in c a s e s of im peachment, shall
be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the S tate w here the said
crime shall have been com m itted...1
The accu sed shall enjoy th e right to a sp eed y and public trial, by
an impartial jury...2
The right to trial by jury shall be preserv ed ...3
Nor shall any S tate deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due p ro cess of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.4
4. A Fully Informed Jury Am endm ent would eliminate any
assum ption that all citizens have acquired the know ledge n ecessary to b e
"Fully Informed Jurors" through formal education or informal channels.

R ecom m endations
The following recom m endations a re being m ade in order to promote the
enactm ent of Fully Informed Jury Legislation:

Recommendation I:
The first recommendation is that support for this legislation be
provided by members of the major political parties and judicial
policy makers.
R ationale I:
Third party support for FIJA legislation h as proven to be unsuccessful. To
d ate no FIJA legislation h a s b een introduced in the N evada legislature.
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However, FIJA activists are busy in th e state of N evada distributing
literature and discussing the issu e of jury nullification a s an individual
right. P erh ap s a s citizens becom e aw are of the power being denied
them, the dem and for this legislation will increase.

Recommendation II:
The second recommendation is educating citizens to be fully
informed jurors. Citizenship must be taught as a whole, in its own
right, with its own curriculum, and reinforced through history,
literature and government. Students must be prepared to accept the
responsibility of the moral agency that comes with citizenship. The
mainstream media and other informal channels of education through
which citizens acquire information and gain knowledge need to
acknowledge the nullification power of the jury. This American
tradition needs to be discussed over the airwaves, on television, and
in print. The media needs to demonstrate jury nullification as a
safeguard to liberty and an acceptable means of resolving jury
deliberations. Educating for citizenship would require changes in
the formal educational system to provide the essential information
students need in order to acquire the knowledge necessary to be
empowered as "fully informed jurors".
Rationale II:
The need to ch an g e the m ethod of educating for citizenship is
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evidenced by the declining proficiency sco res of our nations youth. "The
Civics Report Card"5, is a product of the National A ssessm en t of
Educational P rogress (NAEP), a congressionally m andated project
estab lish ed in 1969 to obtain d ata on the educational achievem ent of
American students. It h a s surveyed civics education in 1976, 1982 and
m ost recently 1988. T he study sum m arizes findings from two
a s s e ss m e n ts m ade. T he first is an a sse ssm e n t of stu d en ts a g e thirteen
and sev en teen y ears old.. T he second is an a ss e ss m e n t of students in
fourth, eighth, and twelfth grade. A reas of a ss e ss m e n t were: their
recognition of the existence of civic life; their understanding of the nature
of political institutions and th e relationship betw een citizen and
governm ent; their understanding of specific governm ent structures and
functions; and their understanding of the variety of political institutions
and p ro c e sse s.6 T he results indicated a significant decline in civics
proficiency over the twelve y ear period (1979-1988).
Perform ance results indicative of the decline include: the
proficiency level of the se v e n te en year old stu d en ts declined significantly
from the previous y ears-in terestin g ly though th e proficiency level of the
thirteen year olds rem ained the sam e; the perform ance g ap betw een the
White, Black and H ispanic thirteen year olds narrow ed d u e to improved
perform ance am ong the Black and Hispanic students. At a g e sev en teen
the narrowing of this gap w as the result of a decline in the perform ance of
the W hite students; decline occurred in both ad v an tag ed and
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disadvantaged urban schools for the sev e n te en year old stu d en ts while
econom ic factors did not influence the perform ance of the thirteen y ear
olds; g en d er w as a factor in the perform ance of th e thirteen year olds
with fem ales improving significantly, although at a g e sev en teen g en d er
w as not a significant influence; and proficiency for sev en teen y ear olds in
th e w estern United S ta te s declined more significantly than in either the
N ortheast or Central regions and only slightly w orse than in the
S outheast.7
T h ese trends w ere determ ined after identical a sse ssm e n ts w ere
adm inistered every fourth year over th e twelve year period in order to
"allow the NAEP to exam ine ch an g es a cro ss time in the civic know ledge
of thirteen and sev e n te en year olds".8 The results w ere analyzed using
item re sp o n se theory (IRT) technology, allowing th e perform ance d ata to
be reported on a single proficiency scale, ranging from 0 to 100. The
information w as analyzed to determ ine national trends a s well a s tren d s
within subpopulations such a s race and ethnicity, size and type of
community, gender, and geographical region. The study d o es not
postulate about the findings.
Instructional findings indicate that 89% of eighth graders reported
having studied civics or governm ent since fifth grade, and 93% of the
twelfth g rad ers reported having taken at least one course in this subject in
high school. T he stu d en ts reported studying a variety of civic subjects
mostly through reading a textbook. It w as found that students who
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reported som e study in the subject a re a dem onstrated a higher
proficiency on the av erag e than stu d en ts who did not study th e subject.
L ess than 8 per cent (7.9) of stu d en ts reported no American G overnm ent
or Civics instruction in high school. The av erag e proficiency level for
th e se student w as recorded at 277.3 in com parison to the 297.9 av erag e
proficiency level the 39.9 per cent of high school stu d en ts who reported
more than one year of American G overnm ent or Civics instruction scored.
It w as also found that the more time sp en t in the instruction of th e social
studies curriculum and the m ore diverse the activities th e higher the
proficiency level on the a sse ssm e n t.
Perusing the a ss e ss m e n t items I found one item referenced to jury
responsibility. The item w as to determ ine if the student knew the "duty of
th e jury is to determ ine if guilty"9. Eighty-seven p ercent of th o se surveyed
re sp o n d ed correctly. My assum ption is that th o se responding did so with
an affirmative answ er which implies th e duty of a jury is limited to fact
finding. If the item w as to survey knowledge of th e nullification power of
the jury, the item should have read ‘duty of jury to determ ine justice
application of the law' rather than;"determ ine if guilty".
Considering this decline in civics proficiency, it is evident that the
formal educational p ro cess in place is not adequately preparing students
for their role a s citizens and jurors. U nderstanding the power of the jury is
an integral part of citizenship. Since the schools a re not adequately
preparing students for citizenship, at least not to th e d e g re e a s in the
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past, their statu s a s informed jurors is en d an g ered if not already extinct.
It is also evident from this decline in proficiency that the informal
educational channels that opponents of a nullification instruction claim to
b e the citizens' source of information and know ledge of their power a s a
juror are not ad equate. If th e se so u rces w ere supplem enting the
information lacking in the formal educational p ro cess the decline in
proficiency would not be significant.
A civics curriculum which incorporates historical background,
philosophical justification, critical thinking and provides for experience in the
civics a re n a n e ed s to be d esigned a s a replacem ent for what is now offered.
This study reinforces my recom m endation that citizenship be taught a s
whole, in its own right, with its own curriculum, and reinforced through
governm ent, history and literature resulting in an understanding of the moral
authority citizens have over their governm ent and the m ean s by which this moral
authority is a c c e sse d through the fully informed trial by jury process.
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APPENDIX

ALTERNATIVE PRO PO SED FIJA AMENDMENT
W henever governm ent is one of the parties in a trial by jury, the court
shall inform the jurors that each of them h a s an inherent right to vote on the
verdict, in the direction of mercy, according to his own conscience and s e n s e of
justice.
T he court shall therefore allow any party to the trial to p resent to th e jury,
for its consideration, evidence and testim ony relating to th e motives and
circum stances of the defendant and the extent to which h e actually harm ed
an o th er person. Any party to th e trial may also p resen t to the jury argum ents
regarding the spirit, intent, merits and constitutionality of th e law itself and its
applicability to the c a s e at hand.
Trial jurors shall acknow ledge by oath that they understand this right, and
no potential juror may be disqualified from serving on a jury for expressing a
willingness to consider such testim ony or evidence, to evaluate the law or it
application, or to vote on the verdict according to conscience.
(2)

Before the jury h e ars a case, and again before jury deliberation

begins, the court shall inform the jurors of their rights in th e se words:
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"As jurors, your first responsibility is to d ecide w hether th e d efendant h as
broken the law. If you determ ine that th e evidence will support a finding of guilt
or liability a s charged, you may so find.
"However, if so finding would violate you conscience or s e n s e of justice,
you may exercise you right to consider, in addition to other evidence and
testimony presented, (a) the motives and the circum stances of th e defendant; (b)
the extent to which the defendant's actions actually dam aged the rights of
another person; and (c) the merits of th e law itself, and the wisdom of applying it
to the defendant in the c a s e before you.
"Such considerations may be u sed a s a b asis for finding a criminal
defendant not guilty, or guilty of a le sse r offense which is wholly contained in the
original charge. In a civil case, such considerations may be u sed a s a b a sis for
finding the defendant not liable, or liable for less than the am ount of d am ag es
claimed by th e plaintiff.
"In no c a s e may you e sc a la te the c h arg es against a criminal defendant, or
increase the aw ard to be paid by a civil defendant beyond the value of the
d am ag es claim ed in the original complaint m ade by the plaintiff.
"The court cautions that with the exercise of your right to vote according
to your own s e n s e of right and wrong, instead of strictly according to th e law,
com es full personal, moral accountability for the verdict you bring in, both to
yourself and to your community."
(3)

Failure to so inform th e jury, to h e ar th e jurors' acknow ledgm ent by

oath that they understand the information given them, or any other infraction of
the above rules of procedure is grounds for mistrial and an o th er jury trial.

Taken from "W hat is "FIJA"?, “FIJA” Jury Pow er Information Kit. Fully
Informed Jury A ssociation, (Helmville, MT) 2
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